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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O F THE STATE O F UTAH

ROSEMARY ABBOTT,
Plaint iff-A ppellant,
C a s e No.
14,409

vs.
BOARD O F EDUCATION O F THE
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT, et a l . .
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS 1 B R I E F

NA TURE OF CA SE
Appellant, a p r o b a t i o n a r y t e a c h e r whose employment contract was
not renewed for the 1975-76 school y e a r , c l a i m s that she w a s t e r m i n a t e d in
violation of h e r constitutional right t o due p r o c e s s and c o n t r a r y to the Utah
O r d e r l y School T e r m i n a t i o n P r o c e d u r e s Act b e c a u s e no r e a s o n s for the nonr e n e w a l o r a h e a r i n g thereon w e r e given h e r ; and she s e e k s an o r d e r compelling
defendants to r e i n s t a t e h e r with all the r i g h t s and benefits to which she would
be entitled had she been r e - e m p l o y e d .

-1,
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court on November 12, 1975, the Honorable
George E . Ballif, presiding. The Court found that appellant failed to establish
any of her claims and entered judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was submitted to the Court on a written statement of facts.
Additional evidence was presented to and received by the Court at the t r i a l .
Respondent does not controvert the facts as set forth in appellant's
brief, but deems the following additional facts to be controlling:
1. Appellant was a "qualifying educator 11 as distinguished from a
"career educator" as those t e r m s are used in the agreement between the school
district and its educators (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14).
2. Career educators are those holding Utah teaching certificates
who have been employed by the school district for three consecutive years
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, section 5-3-1). They have tenure or a right to
re-employment (Section 5-4) and may be terminated only for cause after notice
and a hearing (Sections 17-1-1 et seq.).
3. Qualifying educators are those who have not attained career status.
They are employed for one school year (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, section 5-6).
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If the board decides not to re-employ them, they are entitled to written
notice sixty days before the end of the school year stating that their contract
will not be renewed (Section 5-7).
4. Appellant's contract entitled her to a hearing on claims based
upon an event or condition affecting the interpretation, meaning or application
of the provisions of the agreement between the school district and its
educators, but specifically excluded claims not based upon an event or
condition of said agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Section 18-1-1).
5. That agreement made no requirement that a qualifying educator
employed for a period of one school year be given the reasons for not renewing
such educator's employment contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Sections
5-5, 5-6, 5-7).
6. Under the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act,
the nonrenewal of an educator's employment contract constitutes a

,f

termination M

only if that educator has a "reasonable expectation of continued employment
in successive years pursuant to the employment practices of the school
district" (Section 53-51-3 (2) (b) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 1973);
and the notices and reasons for nonrenewal provided for by the termination
procedures under the Act need be given to only those individuals "entitled
to employment in succeeding years according to district personnel program"
(Section 53-51-5 (2), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 1973).

-3-
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
A P P E L L A N T , AS A QUALIFYING EDUCATOR, DID NOT HAVE A
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO RE-EMPLOYMENT OR AN EXPECTANCY OF
CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INTEREST IN
" P R O P E R T Y " PROTECTED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION O F THE UNITED STATES.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not support
A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m s . On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided
the c a s e s of Board of Regents v Roth, 408 U S 574, 92 S Ct 2701, 33 L Ed 2d
548, and P e r r y v Sindermann, 408 U S 593, 92 S Ct 2694, 33 L Ed 2d 570,
holdingthat the Constitution does not r e q u i r e that a nontenured t e a c h e r be
afforded a hearing or r e a s o n s for his nonretention u n l e s s it can be shown that
the nonretention deprived the teacher of some i n t e r e s t in "liberty 1 1 (which is
not an issue in this case) or "property 1 1 protected by the F o u r t e e n t h Amendment.
Roth w a s hired by Wisconsin State U n i v e r s i t y - O s h k o s h for his first
teaching job for a fixed t e r m of one academic y e a r .
but w a s informed he would not be r e h i r e d .

He completed the y e a r

Under u n i v e r s i t y r u l e s he w a s

given no r e a s o n s for the decision and no opportunity to challenge the s a m e at
any s o r t of hearing because he had no tenure r i g h t s under state law.

Roth sued

claiming that the failure to give him the r e a s o n s for h i s nonretention and an
opportunity for a hearing violated his r i g h t s to p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s .
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a statement
of reasons or a hearing on the decision not to rehire a nontenured teacher
unless it can be shown that the nonrenewal deprives the teacher of an interest
in "liberty 11 or a "property" interest in continued employment; and since the
t e r m s of Roth's employment specifically provided that it would terminate at
the end of the academic year he had no "property" interest protected by
procedural p r o c e s s .
Sindermann had taught for some ten years at three different institutions in Texas. After four y e a r s at the last institution

(which had no

formal tenure system), his one year teaching contract was not renewed.
He was given no reasons for the nonrenewal and no opportunity to challenge
the basis therefor.

In his suit, he too made a claim that his right to

procedural due process had been violated. The Court again stated that a
teacher must show that the decision not to rehire him deprived him of a
"property" interest in continued employment to invoke the protection of
procedural due process. However, it went further and stated that such a
"property" interest could be found in a de facto tenure policy arising from
rules and understandings officially promulgated; but it explicitly declared
that a mere subjective expectancy of re-employment was not protected by
procedural due process.
Appellant's contract was for one school year. Appellant was first
employed by the school district during the 1973-74 school year. She was then
rehired to teach the following year. Her contract specifically provided that as
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a qualifying educator she was employed for a period of one school year
(Plaintiff J s Exhibit No. 14, Section 5-6). She completed her teaching contract
for that year, and in accordance with the provisions thereof was timely and
properly notified that her contract would not be renewed for the coming
school year (a matter which she does not contest).
Appellant's contract gave her no right to re-employment.

Appellant,

not having been employed by the school district for three consecutive years,
had no tenure or right to re-employment under the agreement between the
district and its educators (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Sections 5-3-1 and 5-4).
She was entitled to and did receive notice of nonrenewal sixty days before the
end of the school year. When she completed the school year for which she was
hired, her employment ended as provided by her contract.
Appellant had no expectancy of continued employment. Although
appellant argues that the practices and the policies of the school district
created in her a reasonable expectancy of continued employment, it is to
be noted that the record is devoid of evidence in support of her claim. She
did not testify at the trial, no facts were stipulated to, and there is no
documentary evidence from which it can be concluded that she had even a
mere subjective expectancy of re-employment. All that the evidence shows
is that the school district gives official notice of nonrenewal to very few of
its qualifying educators. There is no evidence that appellant was aware of
that fact or in any way based an expectancy of continued employment thereon.
-6-
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In the recent case of LaBorde v Franklin P a r i s h School Board,
510 F

2d 590 (Ct of Appeals, 5th Cir, 1975), the teacher claimed that

not only had the assistant superintendent told her that he planned to recommend her for tenure, but that the school board had r a r e l y failed to renew
the contract of a teacher who had taught for three y e a r s . The Court held
there had been no violation of her procedural due process rights and stated that
"An expectancy of r e - e m p l o y m e n t s that t e r m is used in both Roth and
Sindermann, connotes more than a personal feeling on the part of the teacher.
The mere fact that the school board may not have exercised its prerogative
to terminate other teachers at the end of their third teaching year does not
negate their right under Louisiana Law to follow that practice. f f
The case of Siler v Brady Independent School District, 393 F Supp
1143 (U S Dist Ct, W D Texas, 1975) also considered the matter of an
expectancy of re-employment.

There the plaintiff's theory was that the

district had a de facto tenure system which accorded him the reasonable
right to expect re-employment because of past actions of the board in the
manner in which they had handled the employment of their teachers and
because of certain statements that had been made from which all teachers
could conclude that they had a reason to expect re-employment so long as
they did a "good job. , f The Court found the evidence insufficient to show that
the plaintiff had a property right in his expectancy of re-employment.

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It further found that the plaintiff had failed to show that he had placed
any reliance on the district's program of re-employment as a result of any action
taken by the board or superintendent directly with him.
The TenthQrcuitCourt of Appeals considered procedural due process
claims in the case of Bertot v School District No. 1, Albany County, Wyoming,
522 F 2d 1171 (1975) with similar results. Two "initial contract teachers n
(as distinguished from Continuing contract t e a c h e r s " under the Wyoming
statute) claimed procedural due process deficiencies in connection with the
nonrenewal of their one year contracts. Relying on the proposition that agreements may be implied though not formalized, and explicit contractual
provisions may be supplemented by other agreements implied from the
promisor's words and conduct in the light of surrounding circumstances, the
teachers pointed to proof of words and acts of the school officials, including
a board member's statement that the board had never failed to rehire a
teacher since 1966 when he came on the board, the superintendent's statement
that approximately 90 percent of the initial contract teachers are rehired,
and the principal's statement that if the teacher's services were satisfactory
she would certainly be re-employed.

In holding that plaintiff's proof had

shown no "common law" of re-employment, the Court stated that the defendants'
conduct and the statements made to the plaintiffs could not be equated to
promissory representations or to words, conduct and usage importing an
agreement and they did no more than state obvious facts.
-8-
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The only evidence presented by the appellant in this case in support
of her claim that she had a reasonable expectation of employment in
succeeding years was the past actions of the school board in connection
with the employment of its qualifying educators. In all of the foregoing
cases, such evidence was found to be inadequate and insufficient to create
an expectancy of re-employment protected by procedural due process,
POINT II
AN EDUCATOR MUST HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OR BE ENTITLED TO EMPLOYMENT IN
SUCCEEDING YEARS FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH ORDERLY
SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT TO A PPLY.
The Utah Orderly Termination Procedures Act differs from the
usual tenure legislation. The Utah law (Sections 53-51-1 et s e q . , Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as enacted in 1973) was enacted the year following Roth
and Sindermann, supra. It is not a teacher tenure law granting specific
tenure rights to teachers and making them subject to removal only for
certain enumerated causes and in a prescribed manner. Rather, it is legislation directed to the school districts of the State requiring them to adopt
termination procedures by contract with their educators or by resolution of
the board (Section 53-51-4). The rights of teachers would appear to arise
out of any such contracts or resolutions.

In this case the district and its

educators negotiated and agreed on termination procedures which were
-9-
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included in the contract between them (Testimony of Joe A. Reidhead,
Transcript page 26); but distinguished between c a r e e r educators and
qualifying educators, the latter not being accorded all of the r i g h t s of
a career educator. Respondents believe that the provisions of the Utah
Act accomodate the termination procedures agreed to by the parties.
The purpose of teacher tenure is to promote a better school
system. Tenure is a concept which has as its objective the promotion
of the good order and welfare of the state and the school system by preventing the removal of capable and experienced teachers on the basis of
personal or political considerations. The Utah Act undoubtedly seeks the
same objective, and the Respondents have pursued this objective by
granting tenure to its career educators who can be terminated only after
notice, a specification of cause, and a hearing. However, following the
philosophy of most tenure systems, the school district's contract with its
educators requires a teacher to serve out a probationary period before
tenure is granted.
The reasons for a probationary period are well stated in the case
of Zimmerman v Board of Education of Newark, 38 N J 65, 183 A 2d 25
(cert den 371 U S 956, 83 S Ct 508, 9 L Ed 2d 502) where the Court observes
that n Inherent in the tenure legislation is the policy that a board's duty to hire
teachers requires more than merely appointing licensed instructors;
it demands that permanent appointments be made only if the teachers are
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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found suitable for the positions after a qualifying trial period. " It then
quotes from one of its earlier decisions where it said in another context:
"It is difficult to evaluate the character, industry, personality, and
responsibility of an applicant from his performance on a written examination or through cursory personal interviews. Knowledge and intelligence
do not alone [suffice] . . . The crucial test of fitness is how he fares on the
job from day to day when suddenly confronted by situations demanding a
breadth of resources and diplomacy. Many intangible qualities must be taken
into account, and, since the lack of them may not constitute good cause for
dismissal under a tenure statute, the [employer]... is entitled to a period
of preliminary scrutiny, during which the protection of tenure does not apply,
in order that it may make pragmatically informed and unrestricted decisions
as to an applicant's suitability. " (183 A 2d 25, at 29)
The Utah Act does not require school districts to establish termination procedures for their probationary teachers. The stated purpose of
the Act is to require school districts to adopt termination procedures and
specify standards of due process and causes for termination (Section 53-51-2).
But by definition (Section 53-51-3), termination does not include the failure
to renew the employment contract of an educator unless that educator has
a "reasonable expectation of continued employment in successive years
pursuant to the employment practices of the school district. 11 The Utah Act
further provides that only individuals "entitled to employment in succeeding
years according to district personnel program" need be accorded the notice
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and other procedures therein provided relating to the nonrenewal of
employment contracts (Section 53-51-5). The obvious reason for the
exclusion of teachers having no expectation of continued employment is
to allow a period of time for school boards to evaluate the teacher's
suitability for employment on a permanent b a s i s .
In this case the employment practices of the school district
gave a right to continued employment only to teachers who had been
employed for three consecutive years, and that practice was clearly
spelled out in the agreement between the district and its educators
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Sections 5-3-1 and 5-4). The appellant had not
attained career status and had no expectation of continued employment.
Therefore, the Act did not apply to require Respondents to proceed in
accordance with its provisions in deciding not to renew appellant's contract
inasmuch as she was not ,! entitled to employment in succeeding y e a r s . M
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case shows that appellant was a qualifying
or probationary teacher, that her employment contract was for a t e r m of
one year, that continued employment was at the discretion of the school
board, and that the agreement between the district and its educators clearly
set forth the requirements for attaining tenure. The evidence of the district's
past actions in giving notice of non-renewal to but few of its qualifying
educators is insufficient to show a de facto tenure system or a "common
-12-
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law" of employment, and appellant presented no evidence whatsoever that
she relied on any words, conduct or usage which would amount to promissory representations creating in her a reasonable expectancy of continued
employment.

When viewed in the light of the decisions of the United States

Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, the appellants claim that
her constitutional right to procedural due process was violated is not tenable.
The decision not to rehire her did not deprive her of any interest in "liberty"
and she had no "property" interest in continued employment.
Likewise, appellant's claim that her rights under the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act were violated is not tenable when
viewed in the light of the provisions of that act.

In accordance with the

legislative directive, the school district and its educators entered into a
contract granting tenure to its c a r e e r educators and providing orderly
termination procedures for them in accordance with the statutory guidelines.
Relying on the provisions of the Act that termination thereunder did not
include the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract unless that teacher had an
expectation of or was entitled to continued employment in succeeding y e a r s ,
a probationary period during which a qualifying teacher could be evaluated
for permanent employment was made an integral part of said contract.
Respondent's have subscribed to the concept of tenure for career
educators with it attendant restrictions on their termination. To extend
those restrictions to probationary teachers as urged by the appellant would
defeat whatever advantages a tenure system may have. The right to continuing
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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employment should be granted only if the t e a c h e r is found suitable for
the position after a qualifying t r i a l period*

Respondents respectfully

r e q u e s t s that the judgment of the t r i a l court be affirmed.

Robert J , Sumsior
Sums ion and Park
80 North 100 E a s t
P r o v o , Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondents
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